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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
 This appeal addresses the dismissal of a suit brought 
by appellant Roger J. Reschini against appellees First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Indiana (the "Association") and 
Charles L. France, the chief executive officer of the 
Association.  The complaint alleged that the Association and its 
chief executive officer had disseminated materially misleading 
proxy materials in violation of regulations adopted by the 
federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in carrying out its 
supervision of federal savings associations.  The allegedly 
deficient proxy materials sought approval by Association members 
of the proposed conversion of the Association from a federal 
(i.e., federally-chartered) mutual savings and loan association 
to a Pennsylvania-chartered mutual savings bank.   
 The district court held that §§ 5(i)(2)(B) and 10(j) of 
the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(i)(2)(B) and 
1467a(j), giving courts of appeals original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over decisions of the Director of the OTS approving 
or disapproving conversions of federal savings associations, 
precluded exercise by the district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over Reschini's claim.  Accordingly, the district 
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  On 
  
appeal we consider three questions: (1) whether Reschini's appeal 
is moot; (2) whether 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(i)(2)(B) and 1467a(j) 
constitute an insurmountable bar to district court subject-matter 
jurisdiction over challenges to proxy materials distributed in 
connection with the Association's conversion; and (3) if 
jurisdiction in the district court is not precluded, whether 
dismissal of this suit was nevertheless required on the ground 
that the complaint failed to state a cognizable cause of action. 
    
 
 I 
   In late December of 1993 or early January of 1994, 
the Association distributed a notice to its members informing 
them that a special meeting would be held on January 28, 1994, 
for the purpose of voting on a conversion plan.  Under the plan, 
the Association would abandon its federal charter and emerge as a 
Pennsylvania-chartered mutual savings bank known as the Indiana 
First Savings Bank.  A proxy statement outlining the plan's 
business purposes and effects accompanied the notice.  
 Depositors in a federally-chartered mutual savings 
association are, pursuant to HOLA, members entitled to vote on 
proposals to convert to non-federal status,1 notwithstanding that 
the proprietary interest of a depositor-member in a mutual 
savings association is a chimera.  Depositor-members "own the 
                     
1
.  12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(3)(A)(ii) (discussed infra part III). 
  
mutual, but it is ownership in name only.  They cannot sell what 
they 'own,' and if they withdraw savings they receive only the 
nominal value of the account rather than a portion of the 
mutual's net worth . . . ."  Ordower v. Office of Thrift 
Supervision, 999 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).  On January 25, 1994, 
Robert Reschini, in his capacity as a depositor-member of First 
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Indiana, brought suit in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Association and 
Charles France, the Association's chief executive officer.  Count 
I of Reschini's complaint, invoking the district court's federal 
question jurisdiction, alleged that the proxy statement, in 
contravention of 12 C.F.R. § 569.4, contained false information 
regarding the principal business reasons for the proposed 
conversion and failed to disclose material information about the 
loss of member voting rights that would accompany the conversion.  
Reschini sought an injunction against the holding of the special 
meeting, an order prohibiting use of the proxy statement and 
requiring a legally sufficient proxy solicitation, costs and 
attorneys fees, and any other relief deemed just and equitable.  
Counts II and III of the complaint asserted state law claims. 
 On the day Reschini commenced suit, Reschini also filed 
a motion for a temporary restraining order.  The next day, 
January 26, 1994, the district court, after a brief hearing, 
entered an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  On February 10, 1994, a special 
  
meeting of Association members was held, and the conversion plan 
was approved by the members.   
 Reschini filed a notice of appeal from the order of the 
district court on February 24, 1994.   Oral argument in this 
court took place on July 12, 1994.  At the time of oral argument, 
the proposed conversion was pending before the OTS but had not 
yet been approved.  On October 18, 1994, the Director of the OTS 
approved the Association's application for conversion; the same 
day the Association completed its conversion to a Pennsylvania-
chartered mutual savings bank.2   
 On November 17, 1994, Reschini filed in this court a 
petition to modify, terminate, or set aside the order of the OTS 
Director approving the proposed conversion.3  We are, however, at 
pains to point out that the petition for review  an invocation 
of this court's appellate authority with respect to certain 
decisions of the OTS Director  has not yet been briefed and 
argued and is not the subject of this opinion; in this opinion, 
and our concomitant ruling, we address only the decision of the 
district court dismissing Reschini's suit against the Association 
and France.  
 
                     
2
.  The record on appeal has been supplemented to include these 
post-oral-argument events. 
3
.  We take judicial notice of the petition for review, filed sub 
nom. Reschini v. Office of Thrift Supervision, No. 94-3625 (3d 
Cir. filed November 17, 1994). 
  
 II 
 As a preliminary matter, we address the contention of 
the Association and France that this appeal is moot because the 
special meeting that Reschini sought to enjoin has already 
occurred and the Association has already converted to a 
Pennsylvania-chartered savings bank. 
 "[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal 
that makes it impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual 
relief whatever' to a prevailing party, the appeal must be 
dismissed."  Church of Scientology of California v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 447, 449 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 
U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).   However, "when a court can fashion 'some 
form of meaningful relief,' even if it only partially redresses 
the grievances of the prevailing party, the appeal is not moot."  
Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Properties, Inc., 998 
F.2d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Church of Scientology, 113 
S. Ct. at 450).  Such relief need not have been requested in the 
pleadings.  Rather, "it is the court's obligation to grant the 
relief to which the prevailing party is entitled whether it has 
been specifically demanded or not."  Kirby v. United States Dep't 
of Housing & Urban Dev., 745 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1984). 
  If we were to find that the district court improperly 
dismissed Reschini's complaint and if, upon remand, Reschini were 
to prevail on his claim, it would then be the district court's 
responsibility to fashion an appropriate decree.  In so doing, 
  
the district court would have the authority to deploy a full 
range of equitable remedies including  if deemed feasible and 
appropriate  a requirement that the Association and France take 
steps to reverse the conversion.  Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970) (where a merger is obtained through 
fraudulent proxy statements, "[p]ossible forms of relief will 
include setting aside the merger or granting other equitable 
relief"); Edelman v. Saloman, 559 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (D. Del. 
1983) (stating that "a decree nullifying the corporate action 
taken on the basis of management's proxies" is a traditional form 
of relief in suits alleging fraudulent proxy materials).  While 
it is conceivable that the district court might eventually 
determine that setting aside the conversion would entail undoing 
what cannot equitably be undone, such a determination would 
depend upon a fact-specific analysis of the circumstances  an 
analysis which we are not now in the position to perform. 
 Because setting aside the conversion remains a possible 
remedy should Reschini prevail on his claim, Reschini's appeal is 
not moot.4    
                     
4
.  In arguing that this appeal is moot, appellees cite General 
Electric by Levitt v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1992), a 
case which involved allegations of proxy fraud in connection with 
the election of corporate directors.  Because the directors' 
terms had expired several months before appellate argument, we 
dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that a court could grant 
equitable relief only "by doing the impossible: enjoining the 
directors from serving expired terms."  General Electric, 980 
F.2d at 934.  Here, unlike in General Electric, the vote which 
utilized the allegedly fraudulent proxy materials continues to 
have effect.  In General Electric, the directors selected through 
the allegedly fraudulent election no longer held their positions 
  
 III   
  Savings association conversions are governed by 12 
U.S.C. § 1464(i), codifying § 5(i) of HOLA.  Section § 1464(i)(3) 
sets forth criteria governing conversions of federally-chartered 
savings associations to state-chartered form (federal-to-state 
conversions).  According to these criteria, a federal-to-state 
conversion may only be performed "upon the vote in favor of such 
conversion cast in person or by proxy at a special meeting of 
(..continued) 
at the time of appeal.  Here, in contrast, the result of the 
allegedly fraudulent vote  i.e., the Association's status as a 
Pennsylvania-chartered savings bank  remains in force. 
 Appellees also cite cases addressing denials of motions 
for preliminary injunctions.  In these cases, the appeals were 
found moot because the actions sought to be enjoined had already 
occurred.  See Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d 
Cir. 1990) ("The merger has taken place, and this court has held 
on numerous occasions that when the event sought to be enjoined 
in a preliminary injunction has occurred, an appeal from the 
order denying the preliminary injunction is moot."); Bank of New 
York Co. v. Northeast Bancorp, Inc., 9 F.3d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir. 
1993) ("In general, an appeal from the denial of a preliminary 
injunction is mooted by the occurrence of the action sought to be 
enjoined."). 
 Unlike the situation at bar, these cases addressed 
appeals from denials of preliminary relief.  In such situations 
it is improper for the appeals court to speculate upon other 
possible relief available since these issues still lie before the 
district court.  See Tropicana Products Sales v. Phillips 
Brokerage Co., 874 F.2d 1581, 1582-83 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(distinguishing between the relief considered on appeal from the 
denial of a motion for preliminary injunction and the relief 
considered on appeal from a final judgment on the merits); 
Marilyn T., Inc. v. Evans, 803 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting consideration of alternative forms of relief where 
this would involve "issues [that] have yet to be resolved by the 
district court").  That approach is inapposite where, as here, we 
address an appeal from a final judgment. 
  
members or stockholders called to consider such action," pursuant 
to 
 the law of the State in which the home office 
of the Federal savings association is 
located, as required by such law for a State-
chartered institution to convert itself into 
a Federal savings association, but in no 
event upon a vote of less than 51 percent of 
all the votes cast at such meeting . . . . 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(3). 
 Section 1464(i)(2)(B) establishes a mechanism for 
judicial review in courts of appeals of orders of the OTS 
Director authorizing or barring proposed conversions.  
Specifically, § 1464(i)(2)(B) states that "[a]ny aggrieved person 
may obtain review of a final action of the Director [of the OTS] 
which approves or disapproves a plan of conversion pursuant to 
this subsection only by complying with the provisions of section 
1467a(j)."  Section 1467a(j) provides in turn for review in 
courts of appeals.5 
                     
5
.  Section 1467a(j) provides in relevant part: 
 
 Any party aggrieved by an order of the 
Director under this section may obtain a 
review of such order by filing in the court 
of appeals of the United States for the 
circuit in which the principal office of such 
party is located, or in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, within 30 days after the date of 
service of such order, a written petition 
praying that the order of the Director be 
modified, terminated, or set aside.  
  
 Appellees contend that §§ 1464(i)(2)(B) and 1467a(j), 
creating an exclusive review mechanism for review of final 
decisions by the Director of the OTS which approve or disapprove 
plans of conversion pursuant to "this subsection," 
§ 1464(i)(2)(B), bar district court subject-matter jurisdiction 
over Reschini's suit.  The district court accepted this 
reasoning, and accordingly dismissed Reschini's claims.6  
 On appeal, Reschini disputes this conclusion for two 
reasons.  First, Reschini claims that the term "this subsection," 
as employed in § 1464(i)(2)(B)'s review provisions, refers only 
to conversions governed by § 1464(i)(2),7 and thus does not cover 
                     
6
.  As stated by the district court: 
 
 Under §5(i)(2)(B) of the Home Owners' Loan 
Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. §1464(i)(2)(B), an 
aggrieved person must first file his 
objections with the Director of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision and then seek review 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §1467a(j).  Section 
1467a(j) provides for exclusive jurisdiction 
within the Court of Appeals.  12 U.S.C. 
§1467a(j) (1993); Ordower v. OTS, 999 F.2d 
1183 (7th Cir. 1993); Harr v. Prudential 
Savings and Loan Association, 557 F.2d 751 
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 
(1978).  Because the Court of Appeals' 
jurisdiction is exclusive, this Court is 
without subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Reschini v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 94-122 (W.D. Pa. 
January 26, 1994). 
7
.  Section 1464(i)(2) refers expressly to mutual-to-stock 
conversions, but not to federal-to-state conversions.  See 12 
U.S.C. § 1464(i)(2)(A) ("No savings association may convert from 
the mutual to the stock form, or from the stock form to the 
mutual form, except in accordance with the regulations of the 
Director."). 
  
federal-to-state conversions, which are governed by 
§ 1464(i)(3).8  The Association and France contend, however, that 
the term "this subsection" refers to § 1464(i) as a whole, not 
just to § 1464(i)(2), and that the federal-to-state conversions 
governed by § 1464(i)(3) therefore fall within the scope of 
§ 1464(i)(2)(B)'s review provisions.  Second, Reschini claims 
that even if § 1464(i)(2)(B)'s review provisions do apply to 
federal-to-state conversions, challenges in district court to the 
accuracy of proxy materials are not barred because such 
challenges do not seek review of "a final action of the Director 
[of the OTS] which approves or disapproves a plan of conversion."  
12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(2)(B).   We examine the second of these two 
claims first. 
 The question whether a suit challenging the accuracy of 
proxy materials submitted in respect of a savings association 
conversion constitutes a challenge to OTS action was considered 
by the Seventh Circuit in Ordower v. Office of Thrift 
Supervision, 999 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).  Ordower concerned a 
federal savings association which gained approval both from the 
OTS and from its depositor-members to change from mutual status 
to stock status.  Following the conversion, two depositors 
commenced two contemporaneous actions.  One was a suit in a 
federal district court in Illinois which alleged that the 
association had utilized misleading proxy statements in seeking 
                     
8
.  See discussion supra for text of § 1464(i)(3). 
  
association members' approval of the conversion; the district 
court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
The other was a petition for review filed in the Seventh Circuit 
challenging, on numerous grounds, the OTS Director's approval of 
the conversion.  The Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeal from 
the district court and the petition for review, disposing of both 
in one opinion.  The court found no fault in the order of the OTS 
Director; but the court held that the district court had 
jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the proxy materials, 
and accordingly remanded that lawsuit for further proceedings. 
 In examining whether the district court had subject-
matter jurisdiction over the depositors' suit alleging the 
fraudulent use of proxy materials, the Ordower court made a 
distinction between challenges to the accuracy of proxy materials 
and challenges to the substance of a conversion plan.  With 
respect to challenges to the substance of a conversion plan, the 
court confirmed that § 1464(i)(2)(B) places exclusive 
jurisdiction in courts of appeals.  "When Congress places review 
of an administrative decision in the court of appeals, district 
judges may not enjoin or penalize action that the agency has 
approved or that is the natural outcome of the agency's 
decision."  Ordower, 999 F.2d at 1188 (citing FCC v. ITT World 
Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984) and Whitney Nat'l Bank 
v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965)).  In 
contrast, because the OTS does not make a finding with respect to 
  
the accuracy of proxy materials, challenges to such materials 
could be entertained in the district court.9        
                     
9
.  In deriving this conclusion, the Ordower court relied upon 
the regulations governing mutual-to-stock conversions, codified 
at 12 C.F.R. § 563b, as well as upon analogy to the practice of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
 
 The OTS does not review the accuracy of 
materials by which management solicits the 
depositors' approval. . . .  Similarly the 
SEC looks over corporate proxy materials 
without approving them.  Defects in these 
materials may be challenged in a district 
court even though the court of appeals is the 
exclusive forum for review of the SEC's 
decisions. . . .  That the OTS has found the 
substance of a transaction in compliance with 
federal law  which is all the OTS's 
approval establishes  does not relieve the 
bank's managers of the duty to tell the truth 
when asking the depositors to approve the 
transaction. . . .  A district court 
accordingly may consider whether the 
materials describing the transaction and 
soliciting that approval were complete and 
accurate. 
 
Ordower, 999 F.2d at 1188 (citations omitted). 
 Harr v. Prudential Savings and Loan Ass'n, 557 F.2d 751 
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978), supports 
the position taken in Ordower.  There, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
a district court's dismissal of a claim for materially misleading 
proxy statements on the basis of 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730a(k) and 
1725(j)(4) (the appeals court review provisions which served as 
precursors to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(i)(2)(B) and 1467a(j)).  The 
court "assumed that the private remedies available under SEC 14A 
as to fraud also exist under the counterpart Bank Regulations," 
Harr, 557 F.2d at 752-53; however, the Tenth Circuit found 
dismissal appropriate because the suit was "in reality . . . a 
challenge to the Bank Board's decision [to approve a mutual-to-
stock savings association conversion] although cast in terms of 
Rule 10b-5," id. at 754.   This analysis is consistent with the 
Ordower court's limitation on the kind of attacks the depositor-
member in that case could make on the allegedly false proxy 
materials.  See Ordower, 999 F.2d at 1188 ("Ordower may not wage 
  
 We find that in the context of the Association's 
proposed federal-to-state conversion, as in the context of the 
mutual-to-stock conversion considered by Ordower, a suit 
challenging the accuracy of proxy materials does not seek to 
"enjoin or penalize action that the agency has approved or that 
is the natural outcome of the agency's decision."  Ordower, 999 
F.2d at 1188.  OTS approval of the Association's application was 
governed by the expedited treatment process set forth in 59 Fed. 
Reg. 44,625 (Aug. 30, 1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 563.22(b)(1)(ii)) and 12 C.F.R. § 516.3(a).10  According to the 
(..continued) 
a collateral attack on the valuation approved by the OTS by 
describing the repetition of that valuation in the proxy 
materials as a form of fraud or deceit."). 
 Similarly, in Craft v. Florida Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 786 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed a challenge to proxy statements as comprising "bare 
bones allegations made to escape the exclusive review provisions 
of the Review Statutes."  Craft, 786 F.2d at 1554.  However, the 
court noted that it was "not called upon here to decide, nor . . 
. express any views concerning the jurisdiction vel non of the 
district court under the federal securities laws when securities 
fraud is properly alleged . . . ."  Id.; cf. Rembold v. Pacific 
First Fed. Sav. Bank, 798 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that "an order approving an application of a conversion 
plan does not relate in any way to the right of the purchaser of 
stock to seek damages against the savings institutions for any 
misrepresentations in the offering circular"). 
10
.  See Letter from Diana Garmus, Deputy Assistant Director, 
Corporate Activities, OTS, to Daniel Weitzel, counsel for 
appellees, of October 18, 1994 ("Pursuant to Section 
563.22(b)(1)(ii)(1994) . . . associations meeting the criteria 
for expedited processing under the OTS applications processing 
regulations (12 C.F.R. § 516.3(a)) may consummate a Sasser 
Conversion after filing a notification with the OTS at least 30 
days prior to the Sasser Conversion.  We believe that the 
Association is subject to the above referenced regulations and 
  
expedited treatment process, "a savings association . . . may 
engage in activities upon filing a notice with the OTS together 
with any necessary certifications.  For these activities, a 
notice will be all that is required and an association may engage 
in the activity unless the OTS objects within 30 days."  12 
C.F.R. § 516.3(a)(2) (1994).  The regulations elaborating upon 
the necessary "notification" state that "[t]he notification may 
be in the form of either a letter describing the material 
features of the transaction or a copy of a filing made with 
another Federal or state regulatory agency seeking approval from 
that agency for the transaction . . . ."  59 Fed. Reg. 44,626 
(Aug. 30, 1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.22(h)(1)). 
 There is no indication that findings with respect to 
the accuracy of proxy materials are part of the expedited 
treatment process.  Rather, as in the mutual-to-stock context 
considered in Ordower, the regulations which governed approval of 
the Association's federal-to-state conversion address the 
(..continued) 
meets the criteria for expedited processing and 30-day 
notification to the OTS.") 
 This case has been complicated by the fact that the OTS 
regulatory structure governing federal-to-state conversions was 
amended during the pendency of this appeal.  Prior to the 
adoption of the regulations published in the Federal Register on 
August 30, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,615-27, federal-to-state 
conversions of mutual savings associations were governed by the 
criteria codified at 12 C.F.R. § 571.5.  See Letter from V. 
Gerard Comizio, Deputy Chief Counsel, Corporate and Securities 
Division, OTS, to Thomas Leahey, counsel for appellees, of May 
26, 1994. Because the OTS letter communicating approval of the 
Association's proposed conversion applied the recently adopted 
regulations, we analyze this case according to those regulations. 
  
substance of the conversion plan, but not the process by which 
that plan is approved by the depositor-members.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that HOLA's provision for court of appeals review of any 
final OTS action that "approves or disapproves a plan of 
conversion," 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(2)(B), does not, of its own 
force, bar district court jurisdiction over allegations of 
materially false or misleading proxy materials.11 
 Because we find that § 1464(i)(2)(B)'s court of appeals 
review provisions, assuming they govern federal-to-state 
                     
11
.  The record suggests that OTS consideration of the 
Association's proposed conversion included some review of the 
proxy materials.  On September 13, 1994, the OTS extended the 
applicable time period for OTS consideration of the conversion 
plan because of "significant issues of law and policy regarding 
whether the solicitation for proxies made by or on behalf of the 
association's board of directors complied with OTS proxy rules."  
Letter from Diana Garmus, Deputy Assistant Director, Corporate 
Activities, OTS, to Daniel Weitzel, counsel for appellees, of 
September 13, 1994. 
 The October 18, 1994 letter approving the conversion, 
however, indicates no findings with respect to the proxy 
materials.  See Letter from Diana Garmus, Deputy Assistant 
Director, Corporate Activities, OTS, to Daniel Weitzel, counsel 
for appellees, of October 18, 1994.  Moreover, mere examination 
of proxy materials by the OTS does not imply OTS findings with 
respect to the accuracy of the statements contained within.  Cf. 
12 C.F.R. § 563b.5(g)(2) (applying to mutual-to-stock 
conversions) ("The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or 
other soliciting material has been filed with or examined by the 
Office and authorized for use shall not be deemed a finding by 
the Office that such material is accurate or complete or not 
false or misleading . . . .").  In the absence of regulatory 
provisions requiring OTS approval of proxy materials as well as 
any explicit findings by the OTS regarding the Association's 
proxy materials, we find the limited review which may have 
occurred inadequate to constitute OTS approval of the accuracy of 
the Association's proxy materials.  
  
conversions, do not bar subject-matter jurisdiction in the 
district court over Reschini's claims, we do not reach Reschini's 
alternative contention  that is, that conversions governed by 
§ 1464(i)(3) fall outside the scope of § 1464(i)(2)(B)'s review 
provisions.12   
 In short, if count I of Reschini's complaint  
alleging that the Association and France distributed a proxy 
statement that was both false and incomplete  states a 
cognizable federal claim, the district court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction to entertain that claim.  To the question whether 
count I states a cognizable federal claim we now turn. 
 
  
 IV 
 Arguing in the alternative, the Association and France 
contended in the district court that, even if the district court 
had jurisdiction to entertain Reschini's suit, the suit should 
nevertheless be dismissed because no implied private cause of 
action exists under 12 C.F.R. § 569.4, the OTS regulation invoked 
by Reschini in count I of his complaint as the source of his 
asserted federal claim.  Because the district court found that it 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Reschini's suit, the 
district court had no occasion to consider this alternative 
contention.  As appellees, the Association and France have 
                     
12
.  See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
  
renewed this contention here.  Having determined that the 
district court, as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, is 
not precluded from entertaining Reschini's suit, we could remand 
to the district court the question whether HOLA contemplates such 
a suit.  But remand would, in all likelihood, result in a 
subsequent appeal again presenting the same question.  Because 
the question is one of law, considerations of judicial economy 
lead us to address the issue now.   
 Reschini bases his claim on 12 C.F.R. § 569.4 
(hereafter "Section 569.4" or "§ 569.4"), which provides as 
follows: 
  
 No solicitation of a proxy shall be made by 
means of any statement, form of proxy, notice 
of meeting, or other communication, written 
or oral, which . . . 
 
 (c)(1)  Contains any statement that is false 
or misleading with respect to any material 
fact, or 
 (2) Omits to state any material fact: 
 (i) Necessary in order to make the statements 
therein not false or misleading or 
 (ii) Necessary to correct any statement in 
any earlier communication with respect to the 
solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting 
or subject matter that has subsequently 
become false or misleading.    
 
Section 569.4 was one of a number of regulations issued by the 
OTS in 1989, the year in which Congress, through the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 
abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and created 
  
the OTS, both to take the place of the FHLBB and to carry on 
other regulatory functions.13  Section 569.4 had originally been 
promulgated by the FHLBB in 1971 pursuant to the FHLBB's general 
regulatory authority under the National Housing Act and had 
applied to savings institutions insured by the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).14  In 1989, the OTS 
repromulgated § 569.4 pursuant to its general regulatory 
authority under HOLA; as repromulgated, § 569.4 applies to all 
savings associations.15  
                     
13
.  FIRREA reorganized the administrative structure applicable 
to savings associations by (1) dissolving the FHLBB; (2) creating 
the Office of Thrift Supervision, under the administration of the 
Department of Treasury, to serve as the successor to the FHLBB's 
former regulatory and chartering functions; and (3) transferring 
the insurance function of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1989), reprinted 
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 106. 
14
.  The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the FHLBB's 
authority to regulate the FSLIC under sections 402, 403, and 407 
of the National Housing Act, formerly codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1725, 1726, and 1730.  See 36 Fed. Reg. 19,973 (October 14, 
1971) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725, 1726, and 1730 as statutory 
authority for the regulations).  Section 402 vested direction of 
the FSLIC in the FHLBB.  Section 403 authorized the FSLIC to 
insure the accounts of federal savings and loan associations.  
Section 407, among other things, authorized the FSLIC to 
terminate the insured status of any institution engaged "in an 
unsafe or unsound practice" or which found itself "in an unsafe 
or unsound condition to continue operations as an insured 
institution." § 407(b)(1). 
15
.  The OTS repromulgated the regulations pursuant to its 
general regulatory authority under HOLA, codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1462, 1462a, and 1463.  See 12 C.F.R. § 569 (1994) (citing 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1462a, and 1463 as statutory authority).  
Section 1462 defines terms.  Section 1462a establishes the OTS 
and the position of Director of the OTS.  Section 1463 confers on 
  
 The language of § 569.4 closely tracks that of SEC Rule 
14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9,16 issued pursuant to section 14(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).17  
(..continued) 
the Director general authority to regulate savings associations 
and to prescribe accounting and disclosure standards for savings 
associations. 
16
.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 provides in relevant part: 
 
 No solicitation subject to this regulation 
shall be made by means of any proxy 
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, 
or other communication written or oral, 
containing any statement which, at the time 
and in the light of the circumstances under 
which it is made, is false or misleading with 
respect to any material fact, or which omits 
to state any material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements therein not false or 
misleading or necessary to correct any 
statement in any earlier communication with 
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for 
the same meeting or subject matter which has 
become false or misleading. 
17
.  Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), provides 
that 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, by the 
use of the mails or by any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
any facility of a national securities 
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of 
investors, to solicit or to permit the use of 
his name to solicit any proxy or consent or 
authorization in respect of any security 
(other than an exempted security) registered 
pursuant to section 78l of this title. 
 
 
  
Rule 14a-9, taken together with its statutory parent, was found 
by the Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), to 
support a private cause of action for materially misleading proxy 
statements.  
 
 
 A 
 Borak was decided in 1964.  It is still good law as a 
construction of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9.  However, it is not 
clear that Borak, if it arose for the first time today, would be 
decided the same way.  See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("[S]ince Borak we have adhered to a 
stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action 
. . . .").  Starting in 1974, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), 
the Court has in a series of decisions developed the governing 
law on the implication, within the interstices of federal 
statutes and regulations, of private causes of action.  Cort v. 
Ash directed courts to consider four factors  whether (1) "the 
plaintiff [is] 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted'"; (2) "there [is] any indication of 
legislative intent . . . to create such a remedy or to deny one"; 
(3) "it [is] consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy"; and (4) "the cause of 
action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law."  Cort, 422 
U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).  However, as the Court observed 
  
in Touche Ross, "the [Cort] Court did not decide that each of 
these factors is entitled to equal weight.  The central inquiry 
remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or 
by implication, a private cause of action."  Touche Ross, 442 
U.S. at 575.  See also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) ("The rule that has emerged in the years 
since Borak and Mills came down is that recognition of any 
private right of action for violating a federal statute must 
ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private 
remedy.") (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 560). 
 In light of developments since Borak, the question 
whether a private cause of action for depositor-members of mutual 
savings associations is implied under § 569.4's proxy provisions 
must begin with an examination of congressional intent. 
 Reschini has not identified any provision of HOLA or 
the National Housing Act that indicates congressional intent "to 
create, either expressly or by implication," a private cause of 
action.  Our own examination has been no more fruitful.  In 
particular, we find nothing in the provisions constituting the 
statutory footing for § 569.4 that is supportive of a private 
cause of action.18 
 Reschini contends, however, that § 569.4 is a 
regulatory embodiment of a "specific congressional intent," Brief 
of Roger R. Reschini, Appellant, at 8 n.7, located not in HOLA or 
                     
18
.  See supra notes 14-15. 
  
the National Housing Act, but in 1974 amendments to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Specifically, Reschini asserts 
that language added to § 12(i) in 1974 requires the implication 
of a private cause of action under § 569.4's proxy provisions. 
 Section 12(i)  a 1964 addition to the 1934 Act  
authorizes certain non-SEC agencies to administer the 1934 Act's 
provisions with respect to securities issued by institutions over 
which these agencies have regulatory authority.19  As originally 
adopted, § 12(i) did not grant any regulatory authority to the 
FHLBB.  Congress remedied this omission in 1974, however, 
providing regulatory authority to the FHLBB over securities 
issued by institutions whose accounts were insured by the FSLIC.   
Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1500, 1503-04 (1974), 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(i).  Section § 12(i) was again 
amended in 1989 via FIRREA; in the amended version, the OTS was 
substituted for the FHLBB and was given regulatory authority with 
respect to securities issued by institutions whose accounts are 
                     
19
.   As added in 1964, § 12(i) vested the SEC's "powers, 
functions, and duties" (1) with respect to national and District 
of Columbia banks, in the Comptroller of the Currency; (2) with 
respect to all other member banks of the Federal Reserve System, 
in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and (3) 
with respect to all other insured banks, in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(e), 78 Stat. 565, 
568-569 (1964), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(i).  The provision 
contemplated "extend[ing] disclosure protection to investors in 
[bank] securities and at the same time [providing] for full 
coordination with the safeguards provided by the Federal bank 
regulatory structure."  S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 
(1963). 
  
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78l (Historical and Statutory Notes, 1989 Amendment). 
 The 1974 amendment to § 12(i), in addition to its grant 
of regulatory authority to the FHLBB, added language directing 
the non-SEC agencies to issue regulations "substantially similar" 
to those promulgated by the SEC pursuant to numerous sections of 
the 1934 Act, including § 14(a): 
 In carrying out their responsibilities under 
this subsection, the agencies named . . . 
shall issue substantially similar regulations 
to regulations and rules issued by the [SEC] 
under sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 
14(f) and 16 [of the 1934 Act], unless they 
find that implementation of substantially 
similar regulations with respect to insured 
banks and insured institutions [is] not 
necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for protection of investors, and 
publish such findings, and the detailed 
reasons therefor, in the Federal Register. 
15 U.S.C. § 78l(i).  For the reasons that follow, we disagree 
with Reschini's contention that § 12(i)'s "substantially similar" 
language provides the requisite congressional intent to create a 
private cause of action under § 569.4 for depositor-members of 
mutual savings associations. 
 First, while Reschini's argument for a private cause of 
action under OTS proxy regulations may have merit insofar as it 
applies to proxy regulations issued pursuant to § 12(i)'s 
mandate,20 § 569.4 is not such a regulation.  As described above, 
                     
20
.  Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 563d (citing § 12 of the 1934 Act as 
statutory authority).  Those regulations provide in part: 
 
  
§ 569.4  was originally adopted in 1971 pursuant to the general 
FHLBB's general regulatory authority under the National Housing 
Act  three years before § 12(i) was amended to give the FHLBB 
authority to administer the 1934 Act's securities provisions.  
When § 569.4 was promulgated anew by the OTS in 1989, the OTS 
cited its general regulatory authority under HOLA.  On neither 
occasion was § 12(i) of the 1934 Act mentioned as authority for 
the regulation. 
 Second, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provisions are 
simply not relevant to the ownership interests held by Reschini.  
The 1934 Act establishes a statutory scheme covering certain 
types of securities.  Originally, the 1934 Act applied only to 
securities traded on national securities exchanges; in 1964, 
Congress passed the Securities Act Amendments which extended the 
1934 Act's protections and requirements to include many over-the-
counter securities as well.  See S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st 
(..continued) 
 In respect to any securities issued by 
savings associations, the powers, functions, 
and duties vested in the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the "Commission") to 
administer and enforce sections 12, 13, 
14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f), and 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") 
are vested in the Office.  The rules, 
regulations and forms prescribed by the 
Commission pursuant to those sections or 
applicable in connection with obligations 
imposed by those sections, shall apply to 
securities issued by savings associations, 
except as otherwise provided in this part. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 563d.1. 
  
Sess. 1 (1963) (a "primary objective" of the 1964 amendments is 
to "improve investor protection by extending to the larger 
companies in the over-the-counter market the registration, 
reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider trading requirements 
now applicable to companies listed on an exchange").21   
 Reschini's ownership interest, however, is not among 
those types of securities covered by the 1934 Act's protections, 
even as expanded in 1964.  When, in 1964, Congress extended the 
1934 Act's protections to certain over-the-counter securities, it 
specifically excluded from coverage "any security, other than 
permanent stock, guaranty stock, permanent reserve stock, or any 
similar certificate evidencing nonwithdrawable capital, issued by 
a savings and loan association."  15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(2)(C).  Given 
that § 12(i) directs regulatory agencies to issue "substantially 
similar" regulations to those of the SEC in the context of 
"carrying out their responsibilities under this subsection," it 
would be anomalous to find that this language evidences 
congressional intent to create a private cause of action with 
                     
21
.  Accordingly, the Securities Act Amendments (1) added 
registration requirements for most securities with certain 
minimum assets and number of stockholders, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g); 
and (2) amended the disclosure requirements to encompass all 
registered securities.  For example, § 14(a)'s language, which 
previously applied to proxies in respect of any nonexempt 
security "registered on any national securities exchange" was 
amended to apply to any nonexempt security "registered pursuant 
to section 12 of this title."  See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (Historical 
Note, 1964 Amendment). 
  
respect to ownership interests outside the 1934 Act's 
protections.22 
 Because § 569.4 was not promulgated pursuant to § 12(i) 
of the 1934 Act, and because the 1934 Act does not even apply to 
the ownership interests of depositor-members in mutual savings 
associations, we find no evidence in § 12(i) of congressional 
intent to create a private cause of action for depositor-members 
of mutual savings associations under § 569.4. 
 
 B 
 In the preceding section of this opinion we have 
addressed, as the touchstone issue, the question of congressional 
intent to establish a private cause of action.  But there is a 
further issue to be addressed.  Bearing in mind that  as in 
Borak  certain private causes of action were judicially implied 
in the pre-Cort era when congressional intent was "not . . . the 
considered focus," Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991), the question arises whether the non-
implication of a private cause of action would be "demonstrably 
                     
22
.  In King v. Edwards, 559 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Ga. 1982), the 
court concluded that the 1974 amendment to § 12(i) provided 
evidence of congressional intent to create a private cause of 
action under FHLBB proxy rules.  King, 559 F. Supp. at 83.  For 
the reasons set forth in the text, we disagree with this 
reasoning insofar as it applies to depositor-members of federal 
mutual savings associations seeking to convert to state-chartered 
form. 
  
inequitable to a class of would-be plaintiffs with claims 
comparable to those previously recognized," id. at 1104. 
 [W]here a legal structure of private 
statutory rights has developed without clear 
indications of congressional intent, the 
contours of that structure need not be frozen 
absolutely when the result would be 
demonstrably inequitable to a class of would-
be plaintiffs with claims comparable to those 
previously recognized. Faced in that case 
with such a claim for equality in rounding 
out the scope of any implied private 
statutory right of action, we [look] to 
policy reasons for deciding where the outer 
limits of the right should lie.   
 
 
Id. at 1104-05 (discussing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723 (1975)). 
 The "previously recognized" cause of action to which 
Reschini's claim might be compared is that implied by the Borak 
Court under SEC Rule 14a-9.  Reschini's claim, like the claim at 
issue in Borak, involves an allegation of materially misleading 
proxy statements.  Unlike the proxy statements in Borak, however, 
the proxy statements of which Reschini complains are not subject 
to the proxy disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act.  As discussed 
above, securities issued by savings associations  with the 
exception of certain types of securities not relevant here  are 
expressly excluded from coverage of the Act's requirements and 
protections.  15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(C). 
  We find this difference to be significant.  When 
Congress exempted accounts in savings and loan associations from 
  
the 1934 Act's requirements, it did so on the basis of an 
important distinction between such accounts and other types of 
securities: the lack of a trading interest.  See S. Rep. 379, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 61 (1963) (explaining the exemption for 
"share accounts in savings and loan associations" on the basis 
that "[t]here is normally no trading interest in . . . [this 
category] of securities").  The Ordower court also discussed the 
insubstantial nature of the ownership interests held by 
depositor-members of a mutual savings association.23  These 
characteristics lead us to conclude that Reschini's ownership 
interest in his savings account is not sufficiently comparable to 
the interests of persons with claims under SEC Rule 14a-9 such 
that the failure to recognize a private cause of action would be 
"demonstrably inequitable."24  
                     
23
.  See supra text following note 1. 
24
.  Reschini's reliance on Ordower with respect to implication 
of a private cause of action is inapposite.  There, after ruling 
on the jurisdictional question discussed in Part III, supra, the 
court held that a challenge to the accuracy of proxy materials 
used in a mutual-to-stock conversion could be brought in a 
district court, thus suggesting the existence of a private cause 
of action.  Ordower, 999 F.2d at 1188. 
  Ordower, however, concerned different proxy 
regulations, those at 12 C.F.R. § 563b, in the context of a 
mutual-to-stock, rather than a federal-to-state, conversion.  
Mutual-to-stock conversions, which result in securities to which 
the 1934 Act's registration and disclosure requirements apply, 
are regulated in part by the 1934 Act's requirements.  See 12 
C.F.R. § 563b (citing 1934 Act provisions as statutory authority 
for regulations governing mutual-to-stock conversions).  Federal-
to-state conversions of mutual savings associations, in contrast, 
have no connection with the issuance of securities protected by 
the 1934 Act.  Thus, Ordower is not authority for implying a 
  
 
 C 
 Our analysis has revealed no evidence of congressional 
intent to create a private cause of action under § 569.4 for 
depositor-members of mutual savings associations.  Moreover, we 
are not persuaded that non-implication of a private cause of 
action would create a situation "demonstrably inequitable" to 
such depositor-members.  Thus, we conclude that count I of 
Reschini's complaint does not state a federal claim on which 
relief can be granted. 
 
 
 V 
 Accordingly, albeit because of the absence of a 
cognizable federal cause of action rather than for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, the judgment of the district court 
dismissing Reschini's complaint will be affirmed. 
(..continued) 
private cause of action under 12 C.F.R. § 569.4 in the context of 
federal-to-state conversions of mutual savings associations. 
  
 
